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SHINING A LIGHT: THE NEED FOR
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT IN JUVENILE
JUSTICE FACILITIES AND REFORM OF THE
PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT.
CHRISTINE BELLA
I. INTRODUCTION1
New York State has undergone significant changes to its juvenile justice
system in recent years. The juvenile justice system in New York State has
been transformed as a result of recent lawsuits by the United States
Department of Justice2 and The Legal Aid Society,3 landmark 2012 State
Close to Home legislation,4 the closure of juvenile placement facilities in
upstate New York by then Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS)
Commissioner Gladys Carrión,5 and other city and state initiatives to keep
children in their communities. Still more reforms are on the horizon.6
The experience of children before and after these reforms highlights the
need for continued attention, oversight, and reform. “In the city they hit
you a lot, but upstate they hit you hard.”7 This is how a young man
distinguished between how staff in the local detention facilities8 and staff
1 Special thanks to Daniel Abdul-Malak for his assistance with research and writing for this article.
2 See generally United States v. N.Y., 10-CV-00858, (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
3 See generally G.B. et al. v. Carrión et al,. N.Y.L.J., Jan. 27, 2012 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012)
(Crotty, J.) (The Legal Aid Society, along with the law firm of Orrick, Herrington and Sutcliff LLP.,
filed a lawsuit on behalf of fifteen named plaintiffs and a putative class of New York State Office of
Children and Family Services (OCFS) residents against OCFS, seeking: (1) prospective relief to prevent
unlawful physical restraints and to improve mental health treatment on behalf of the class; and (2)
damages for the individual named plaintiffs).
4 “Close to Home” is a series of recent legislative amendments that amounts to a major
transformation in juvenile justice policy in NYS. Simply put, rather than being sent to larger facilities
in upstate New York, as had been the case, New York City youth, adjudicated delinquent and placed by
Family Court judges, will be sentenced to small facilities located in (and near) New York City, closer to
their families, communities, and other supports, and where they can receive educational credits. N.Y.
Assemb. B. 9057, 2011-12 Gen. Assemb. (N.Y. 2012).
5 In December 2013 New York City Mayor Bill di Blasio appointed Gladys Carrión as
Commissioner of the New York City Administration for Children’s Services.
6
See infra footnotes 12 – 14.
7 2009 Interview with young man in state-operated facility for juvenile delinquents.
8 See Barry Holman & Jason Zeidenberg, JUSTICE POLICY INST., The Dangers of Detention: The
Impact of Incarcerating Youth in Detention and Other Secure Facilities 2 (2006) (defining detention
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in the state facilities9 physically restrained youth in their custody.10 This
seemingly simple statement speaks volumes and offers a rare glimpse into
the treatment of incarcerated youth. It reveals on the one hand a system
that is over-reliant on restraint use, describing staff that are quick to use
physical interventions, and on the other hand, a system in which staff
frequently resort to the use of excessive force during physical restraints.
Clearly, both practices are harmful to both youth and staff.
This article examines the harms that incarcerated youth11 face and
emphasizes the need for greater protections through increased oversight,
advocacy, and legislative reform. Even after the aforementioned historic
reforms, presently New York still stands as one of two states in which the
age of criminal responsibility for any offense is just 16.12
On April 9, 2014, Governor Andrew Cuomo announced the creation of a
Commission on Youth, Public Safety and Justice.13 The Commission,
tasked with providing “concrete, actionable recommendations regarding
youth in New York’s criminal and juvenile justice systems issued its report
with
recommendations
in
January
2015.14
Notwithstanding the Commission’s report which contains among other
things, recommendations to raise the age of criminal responsibility in New
York for some youth for some offenses, certain youth will continue to be
and explaining why some youths end up in detention) (quoting V. Schiraldi & J. Ziedenberg, JUSTICE
POLICY INST., The Multnomah Experiment: Reducing Disproportionate Minority Confinement (2003)).
9 See The Annie E. Casey Foundation, No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Juvenile
Incarceration 2 (2011) (defining and describing state juvenile correction systems) (citing Hazel & Neal,
Youth Justice Board, Cross-National Comparison for Youth Justice (2008)).
10 See Council for Exceptional Children, CEC’s Policy on Physical Restraint and Seclusion
Procedures
in
School
Settings
(2009),
available
at
https://www.cec.sped.org/~/media/Files/Policy/CEC%20Professional%20Policies%20and%20Positions
/restraint%20and%20seclusion.pdf (defining a physical restraint, and providing the standard views and
uses of physical restraint in schools and other programs today).
11 Significant scientific research continues to support the long-held notion that children and
adolescents are different from adults. Advances in technology have allowed scientists to see exactly
how adolescent brains differ, demonstrating which parts of the brain continue to develop well into the
mid-20s. These differences have important legal implications, particularly for the treatment of youth in
our justice system. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 554 (2005) (defining “youth” or
“juvenile” as any person under 18); Cf. Fam. Ct. Act §119(c); see also Dom. Rel. Law § 2; see also
N.Y. C.P.L.R. §105(j); see also Mental Hyg. § 1.03(26); but see N.Y. C.P.L. § 720.10(1) (defining
“youth” as a “person charged with a crime alleged to have been committed when he was at least sixteen
years old and less than nineteen years old, or a person being charged as a juvenile offender as defined in
subdivision forty-two of section 1.20 of this chapter.”).
12 The Commission on Youth, Public Safety and Justice was created by Executive Order 131 on
April 9, 2014. See also Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor, Press Release, April 9, 2014.
13
Id.
14
Final Report of the Governor’s Commission on Youth, Public Safety and Justice, Recommendations
for Juvenile Justice Reform in New York State, January 2015.
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/ReportofCommissiononYouthPubl
icSafetyandJustice_0.pdf
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prosecuted as adults.15 Additionally, at present, despite the Department of
Justice’s scathing findings and subsequent 2014 lawsuit alleging
constitutional violations regarding the treatment of youth at Rikers Island,
adolescents between the ages of 16 and 18, continue to be housed in adult
facilities,16 and still others prosecuted between the ages of thirteen and
fifteen as adults are held in secure juvenile facilities.17 With regard to
legislative reform specifically, this article calls for an amendment to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)18 that would exclude incarcerated
youth from its purview.19 Application of the PRLA to all inmates,
including youth, acts as a barrier to allowing incarcerated youth to obtain
access to the courts and to receive protection from harm while in custody.
The PLRA was enacted largely to limit courts from ordering broad
prospective relief against correctional agencies20 and to stem what was
reported to be an influx of purportedly “frivolous” prisoner claims in
federal court.21 The PLRA requires the “exhaustion of available
administrative remedies” before filing claims in federal court related to any
condition of confinement, including claims of abuse and lack of

15

Id.
16 Inmates between the ages of 16 and 18 are held in the Robert N. Davoren Center at Rikers
Island while awaiting trial. On August 4, 2014, The United States Department of Justice released a
report which included among other things a finding that there is a pattern and practice of conduct at
Rikers that violates the constitutional rights of adolescent inmates. U.S. Inquiry Finds a Culture of
Violence Against Teenage Inmates at Rikers Island. NEW YORK TIMES, August 5, 2014
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/05/nyregion/us-attorneys-office-reveals-civil-rights-investigation-atrikers-island.html?ref=nyregion&_r=0
17 Youth prosecuted as Juvenile Offenders (between the ages of thirteen and fifteen of certain
enumerated offenses) in New York City are held pretrial in one of two secure detention facilities
operated by the New York City Administration for Children’s Services. See infra footnote 26.
18 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-34, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified in Titles 11,
18, 28, and 42 of the United States Code). Although this writer believes that the PLRA should be
repealed in its entirety due to its harsh and unjust consequences, this article is limited in scope and
merely asserts that the PLRA is particularly harsh and misplaced and should be amended, at a
minimum, so it is no longer applicable to detainees or prisoners under the age of 21.
19 Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2009, H. R. 4335, 111th Cong. (2009). This Act is the most
recent attempt at legislative reform of the PLRA. The proposed amendment provided, in relevant part:
“Section 4. Exemption of Juveniles from Prison Litigation Reform Act (a) Title 18.— (1) Juvenile
Proceedings—Section 3626(g) of Title 18, United States Code, (to be amended)—(A) in paragraph (3)
by striking ‘or adjudicated delinquent for,’; and (B) to that paragraph (5) reads as follows: ‘(5) the term
‘prison’ means any Federal, State, or local facility that incarcerates or detains prisoners; . . . ‘“ This
amendment did not pass. Senator Paul Wellstone also proposed amendments to the PLRA to, among
other things, to remove juveniles from the PLRA. See Mental Health Juvenile Justice Act of 1999, S.
464, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 465, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 837, 106th Cong. (1999).
20 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7) (2000). The PLRA requires that prospective relief be “narrowly drawn,
extend . . . no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. §
3626(a)(1)(A). See generally John Boston, Prisoners’ Self-Help Litigation Manual, Oxford Univ. Press,
4th ed., 2010.
21 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000). See 141 Cong Rec. 27, 042 (1995). See generally John Boston,
Litigation Manual.
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treatment.22 The Supreme Court has stated that the PLRA “exhaustion”
requirement, which will be discussed more fully, was intended to “reduce
the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits” and to allow
“corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally
before allowing the initiation of a federal case.”23 Application of the PLRA
to keep incarcerated youth from bringing federal claims is entirely
misplaced. First, incarcerated youth require greater protections and
oversight due to their marginalized status and acute vulnerabilities to harm.
Second, incarcerated youth file very few lawsuits, including before the
enactment of the PLRA.24
II. ISOLATION AND VULNERABILITY: CONDITIONS THAT IMPACT THE
LIVES OF INCARCERATED YOUTH
Incarcerated youth often face serious challenges that neither their
families nor the public-at-large are even aware of.25 Historically,
incarcerated youth in New York State, have been sent to large remote
facilities where they are geographically and socially isolated.26 In New
22 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (g)(3). In addition to the exhaustion requirement, the PLRA has several
other provisions that are of great concern and limit prisoners from seeking protections from the court in
conditions litigation. The PLRA imposes limitation on prospective relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000).
The PLRA limits relief for emotional and mental injury to only occasions where the plaintiff can
demonstrate physical injury. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see, e.g., Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192,
1199 (11th Cir. 2011). But see Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2002). See also
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (amending §
7(e) of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997e(e)) to add “the commission of
a sexual act” to the physical harm requirement). The PLRA also restricts the amount of attorney’s fees,
rather than allow for market rates. See Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373 (4th Cir. 1997). The PLRA
requires prisoners who file in forma pauperis to pay the full filing fee, which is several hundred dollars.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)-(b).
23 Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002).
24 See Human Rights Watch, No Equal Justice: The Prison Litigation Reform Act in the United
States,
June
15,
2009,
at
n.
11,
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/filed/reports/us0609webwcover.pdf (citing Margo Schlander and
Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons: The Care for Amending the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 152 n. 66 2008). See also Michael J. Dale,
Lawsuits and Public Policy: The Role of Litigation in Correcting Conditions in Juvenile Detention
Centers, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 675 (1998).
25 See CITIZENS’ COMMITTEE FOR CHILDREN OF NYC, INC., Inside Out: Youth Experiences Inside
New York’s Juvenile Placement System, at 4 (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.cccnewyork.org/dataand-reports/publications/ccc-report-inside-out-youth-experiences-inside-new-yorks-juvenile-placementsystem/ (“New York State’s juvenile placement system has historically been cut off to the public eye
despite years of poor youth outcomes and anecdotal evidence from former youth residents who have
shed light on the conditions of care and who have spoken about the negative social and emotional
impact of being locked up at an early age”).
26 Megan F. Chaney, Keeping the Promise of Gault: Requiring Post-Adjudicatory Juvenile
Defenders, 19 GEO J. ON POVERTY L & POL’Y 351, 354 (2012). Sandra Simkins, Marty Beyer & Lisa
Geis, The Harmful Use of Isolation in Juvenile Facilities: the Need for Post-Disposition
Representation, 38 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 241, 257-61 (2012);
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York State and some other jurisdictions,27 this trend is changing for
some,28 but not all youth.
In the case of New York, for example, “juvenile offenders”29 (youth
convicted as “adults” or adjudicated as “youthful offenders”30 for offenses
committed between the ages of thirteen and fifteen) continue to be sent to
large, distant facilities.31 And New York’s sixteen and seventeen year olds
are charged, prosecuted, and sentenced as adults regardless of offense, with
pre-trial detainees and sentenced prisoners being held in adult facilities.32
Incarcerated youth are frequently unaware of their rights and are often
unable to effectively assert them. They typically lack meaningful access to
counsel,33 and unlike adult prisoners, those sentenced to juvenile facilities
lack access to law libraries or legal information in the facilities where they
are held.34 Further, it is important to note in this context that juveniles
cannot even file federal lawsuits on their own, due to infancy, as the courts
27 “Missouri’s Department of Youth Services has become a national model for juvenile justice
systems” with their “emphasis on small facilities . . . and focus on support and rehabilitation.” JUSTICE
POLICY INSTITUTE, The Costs of Confinement: Why Good Juvenile Justice Policies Make Good Fiscal
Sense, May 2009 p.9.
28 See infra, footnote 3. Close to Home legislation. Budget Bill Chapter 57 of the Laws of 2012.
Juvenile Offenders (juveniles prosecuted as adults) will continue to be placed in upstate secure facilities
operated by the Office of Children and Family Services. See also Kendra Hurley, Home in the City,
CHILD WELFARE WATCH BRUSHES WITH THE LAW , Winter 2013/2013, at pp 25-27.
29 NY Crim. Pro L (CPL) § 1.20(42). NY Penal Law § 60.10.
30 NY CPL § 720.10.
31 NY CPL § 70.20(4). In New York State, juveniles prosecuted as juvenile offenders (between
the ages of thirteen and fifteen) are sentenced to the Office of Children and Family Services secure
facilities. Not all New York State youth are sentenced to OCFS facilities. In fact, youths sixteen and
older are sentenced to adult facilities with some site and sounds protections. See also NY Exec. L. §
508.
32 NY CPL § 180.75. New York is one of two states (the other being North Carolina) that
prosecute all 16 and 17-year olds as adults regardless of the offense. See also supra fn. 10 (referring to
the Commission on Youth, Public Safety and Justice); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, “[t]he law has
historically reflected the same assumption that children characteristically lack the capacity to exercise
mature judgment and possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around them” 131
S.Ct. 2394, 2397 (2011). “Children ‘generally are less mature and responsible than adults’ ... [and]
‘often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them’ “ (Id. at 2403 (citations omitted)). Cf supra footnotes 10 - 14.
33 Megan F. Chaney, Keeping the Promise of Gault: Requiring Post-Adjudicatory Juvenile
Defenders, 19 GEO J. ON POVERTY L & POL’Y 351, 252 (2012).
34 “Moreover, youth incarcerated in juvenile facilities generally do not have access to law libraries
or other sources of information about the law that might enable them to sue more often. One court has
even observed, ‘[a]s a practical matter, juveniles between the ages of twelve and nineteen, who, on
average, are three years behind their expected grade level, would not benefit in any significant respect
from a law library, and the provision of such would be a foolish expenditure of funds.’” Margo
Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons: The Case for
Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 152-53 (2008) (citing
Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 790 (D.S.C. 1995)). See Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp.
773, 790 (D.S.C. 1995). This case states that it would be a waste of resources to provide a law library to
incarcerated youth, namely juveniles between the ages of twelve and nineteen, because given their
educational delays, they would not benefit from such a service.
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require their parents, guardians, “next friends,” or guardian ad litems to
commence an action.35
To make matters worse, heightened privacy laws, ostensibly for the
juvenile’s protection, limit access to information about the conditions of
their confinement. Such youth exist in a rigidly controlled environment
that allows only limited and highly supervised contact with the outside
world, family members included. Even where family members or
advocates know about harmful situations, they do not always know where
to turn for meaningful relief and often fear retaliation against the young
person if they raise their concerns.
A. UNDERSTANDING THE POPULATION OF “INCARCERATED YOUTH”
A discussion of the conditions of confinement for youth must
acknowledge the impacted community, First, disproportionate minority
contact/confinement (DMC)36 while not unique to incarcerated youth (it
exists at every stage of the juvenile or criminal process),37 is strikingly
evident when walking into a youth facility or prison.38 Secondly, many
incarcerated youth lack strong familial support, suffer from a multitude of
disabilities, including mental illness,39 cognitive and educational delays,40
35 FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c); see FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2.
36 Huizinga, David et al., Disproportionate Minority Contact in the Juvenile Justice System; A
Study of Differential Minority Arrest/Referral to Court in Three Cities, A Report to the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. (July 8, 2007). Disproportionate Minority Confinement
2002, Update Summary Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (September 2004).
37 In New York City, roughly 88 percent of the youth arrested are either Black or Latino, groups
that comprise only 64 percent of the City’s total youth population. In New York State, while minority
youth represent approximately 46 percent of the state’s juvenile population, they account for nearly 65
percent of state’s juvenile arrests. N.Y. STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY GRP., N.Y STATE DIVISION
OF
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SERVICES,
2011
ANNUAL
REPORT
29,
available
at
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/pio/annualreport/JJAGReport2011.pdf.
38 Youth of color constitute an even larger share of the juvenile justice population at later stages of
case processing. In New York City, according to the demographic data taken from ACS’ website for
fiscal year 2012, approximately 95 percent of youth admitted to detention are youth of color; 63.5
percent of youth are Black; 31.1 percent Hispanic, and 2.2% White. NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. FOR
CHILDREN’S SERVICES, DETENTION DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FISCAL YEAR REPORT 2012 1, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/downloads/pdf/acs_Council_Demographic_FY12.pdf. In New York State,
according to a 2011 Juvenile Justice Advocacy Group (JJAG) report, 92 percent of youth entering
detention were youth of color; and 97 percent of youth entering OCFS operated facilities were youth of
color. N.Y. STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY GRP., N.Y. STATE DIVISON OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SERVICES,
2011
ANNUAL
REPORT
29,
available
at
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/pio/annualreport/JJAGReport2011.pdf.
39 Thomas Grisso, speaking at the “Intersection of Mental Health and Juvenile Justice for New
York City Youth” Where We Are and Where We’re Going in Policy and Practice, October 19, 2012.
“About 65 percent of youth in juvenile justice settings meet criteria for one or more mental health
disorders as compared to about 20 percent in the general youth population.” Jennie L. Shufelt & Joseph
Cocozza, Youth with Mental Health Disorders in the Juvenile Justice System: Results from a MultiState Prevalence Study, NAT’L CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 2 (2006), available
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and trauma histories.41 These factors, among others, make it virtually
impossible for youth to access the help they need to hold facilities,
agencies, and staff accountable for misconduct or maltreatment.
For all incarcerated youth, institutional isolation is frequently coupled
with an acute vulnerability to harm.42 Incarcerated youth are exposed to
risks related to the following practices: physical restraints,43 staff on youth
violence or force,44 youth on youth violence, isolation (also known as room
confinement)45 and sex abuse by staff or other youth.46 They are also more
at http://www.ncmhjj.com/pdfs/publications/PrevalenceRPB.pdf.
While researchers estimate that upwards of two-thirds of young people in detention centers could meet
the criteria for having a mental disorder, a little more than a third need ongoing clinical care—a figure
twice the rate of the general adolescent population. Barry Holman & Jason Zeidenberg, The Dangers of
Detention: Impact of Incarcerating Youth in Detention and Other Secure Facilities, JUSTICE POLICY
INST.
8
(November
28,
2006),
available
at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/dangers_of_detention.pdf
(citing
THOMAS GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ADOLESCENT OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS (Univ. of
Chicago Press 2004).
40 Mary M. Quinn, Youth with Disabilities in Juvenile Corrections: A National Survey,
71EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 339, 340 (2005), available at http://www.helpinggangyouth.com/disabilitybest_corrections_survey.pdf. According to the Justice Policy Institute Report by Barry Holman and
Jason Zeidenberg, The Dangers of Detention: Impact of Incarcerating Youth in Detention and Other
Secure Facilities, The Department of Education study showed that 43 percent of incarcerated youth
receiving remedial education services in detention did not return to school after release, and another 16
percent enrolled in school but dropped out after only five months. Barry Holman & Jason Zeidenberg,
The Dangers of Detention: Impact of Incarcerating Youth in Detention and Other Secure Facilities,
POLICY
INST.
9
(November
28,
2006),
available
at
JUSTICE
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/dangers_of_detention.pdf
(citing
LEBLANC, UNLOCKING LEARNING; CHAPTER 1 IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (U.S. Dep’t of Educ.
1991).
41 “Studies from a number of psychological journals report that between 75-93 percent of youth
entering the juvenile justice system annually are estimated to have experienced some degree of
traumatic victimization.” JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, Healing Invisible Wounds: Why Investing in
Trauma-Informed Care for Children Makes Sense 5 (2010).
42 “America’s juvenile corrections institutions subject confined youth to intolerable levels of
violence, abuse and other forms of maltreatment. See RICHARD A. MENDEL, NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE
CASE FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 5 (2011); PATRICIA PURITZ & MARY ANN SCALI,
BEYOND THE WALLS: IMPROVING CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT FOR YOUTH IN CUSTODY 11 (1998).
43 The use of physical restraints is recognized as “an intervention of last resort” due to the highrisk outcomes associated with it, which include trauma, injury, and even death. Michael A. Nunno,
Martha J. Holden, & Amanda Tollar, Learning From Tragedy: A Survey of Child and Adolescent
Fatalities, 30 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1333, 1337 (2006); Researchers note the stress of being
placed in a restraint, in conjunction with the effects of medication can place children at risk. Wanda K.
Mohr and Brian D. Mohr, Mechanisms of Injury and Death Proximal to Restraint Use, 44 ARCHIVES
PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 285, 285 (2000).
44 See RICHARD A. MENDEL, NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE CASE FOR REDUCING JUVENILE
INCARCERATION 5 (2011).
45 IAN KYSEL, GROWING UP LOCKED DOWN: YOUTH IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN JAILS AND
PRISONS
ACROSS
THE
UNITED
STATES
2
(2012),
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/us1012webwcover.pdf; “Nationally, over half of the youth who
committed suicide while in a correctional facility were in solitary confinement and 62 percent had a
history of being placed in solitary confinement.” Research shows that individuals forced into solitary
confinement had much higher rates of recidivism and mental illness. Yee Introduces Bill to Limit Use
of Solitary Confinement of Juveniles, SENATOR LELAND YEE, PH. D (2013),
htttp://sd08.senate.ca.gov/news/2013-08-yee-introcues-bill-limit-use-solitary-confinement-juvenile.
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likely to engage in self-harming and suicidal behavior.47
Consider the significant harms, challenges and hardships facing youth
sentenced as adults.48 Youth sentenced to adult facilities face even greater
risks than youth sentenced as juveniles. They are 36 times more likely to
commit suicide; they are at greater risk of physical and sexual assault; they
are five times as likely to be sexually assaulted;49 and they are twice as
likely to report being “beaten up” by staff.50
B. INCARCERATED YOUTH HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM HARM
“America must not only take better care of its children before they get
into trouble, but also not abandon them when they get into trouble.”51 It has
been more than fifteen years since the American Bar Association Juvenile
Justice Center released its report Beyond the Walls: Improving Conditions
of Confinement for Youth in Custody in response to United States Attorney
General Janet Reno’s quote above.52 Yet incarcerated youth continue to be
marginalized and exposed to harm.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees youth the right to be free from
harm while in confinement.53 Furthermore, according to the Supreme
See also http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/29/nyregion/solitary-confinement-to-end-for-youngest-atrikers-island.html
46 Allen J. Beck & Timothy A. Hughes, SEXUAL VIOLENCE REPORTED BY CORRECTIONAL
AUTHORITIES 7 (2005), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svrca04.pdf. (finding that the rate of
reported sexual violence was nearly ten times higher in juvenile facilities than adult prisons); See also
Prison Rape Elimination Act, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 STAT. 975 (2003).
47 The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention reports that 11,000 youth engage in
more than 17,000 acts of suicidal behavior in the juvenile justice system annually. BARRY HOLMAN &
JASON ZIEDENBERG, THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATING YOUTH IN
DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES 9 (2006). DALE G. PARENT ET AL., CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT: JUVENILE DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS FACILITIES 10 (1994).
48 See supra fn. 12 (DOJ Rikers Report)..
49
T. J. Parsell, Behind Bars, Teenagers Become Prey, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/05/when-to-punish-a-young-offender-and-when-torehabilitate/in-prison-teenagers-become-prey); See also CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE,
http://campaignforyouthjustice.org.
50 The Risks Juveniles Face When They Are Incarcerated With Adults, JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE,
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/97-02_rep_riskjuvenilesface_jj.pdf.
51 Patricia Puritz & Mary Ann Scali, BEYOND THE WALLS: IMPROVING CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT FOR YOUTH IN CUSTODY, iii, (American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Center, 1998).
(quoting Janet Reno, United States Attorney General).
52 Id.
53 The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits the deprivation
of “life, liberty or property without due process of law” guarantees to each child in state custody the
substantive right to be free from harm.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. See also The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). Thus, “when the State takes a person
into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding
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Court, youth prosecuted and sentenced as juvenile delinquents have a
rehabilitative mandate,54 in contrast to those prosecuted in the criminal
justice system.55 Yet despite these so-called protections, incarcerated
youth, so frequently marginalized even from their own families and
counsel, do not receive necessary treatment and are exposed to harms
related to use of physical restraints, isolation and excessive force.
Unequivocally, the job of protecting incarcerated youth from harm falls
squarely on adults; it is the role of legislators, facility administration, staff,
parents and the judiciary alike to ensure the safety and well-being of
incarcerated youth in keeping with both the spirit and letter of the law.
However, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the PLRA, through
its “exhaustion requirement,” shifts this burden of seeking protection onto
the shoulders of incarcerated youth.56
III. LEGISLATIVE REFORM AND THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT
(PLRA)
While it is not the only way to ensure protection from harm, litigation
seeking prospective relief and/or monetary damages for injury, is often a
viable course for bringing about systemic changes to harmful policies and
practices. Though costly, contentious and time consuming, litigation can
also be effective when it comes to changing policy, ensuring accountability
and compensating individuals for injuries. A major barrier to bringing such
litigation on behalf of incarcerated youth, however, is the PLRA.
The PLRA applies to incarcerated youth and adults alike.57 The act
defines the term “prisoner” broadly to mean “any person subject to
incarceration, detention, or admission to any facility who is accused of,
convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of
duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.” DeShaney v.Winnebago
County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989).
54 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967). Cf. Paul Holland & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Whatever
Happened to the Right to Treatment?: The Modern Quest for a Historical Promise, 68 TEMP. L. REV.
1791, 1794 (1995) “[These facilities] remain ill-equipped to provide children living in them with the
education, behavior modification, counseling, substance abuse treatment, and the mental and physical
health care they need.” See also Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
55 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).
56 Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons:
The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 152-54 (2008)
(discussing Minix v. Pazera, 2005 WL 1799538 no page numbers (N.D. Ind. July 27, 2005)).
57 See Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2003); Alexander S. v. Boyd,
113 F.3d 1373, 1383-85 (4th Cir. 1997) (Both holding that the PLRA limits on attorneys’ fees applies to
cases brought by juveniles adjudicated delinquent). See also, Doe v. Cook Cty., 1999 WL 1069244, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 1999) (rejecting plaintiffs arguments that the PLRA doesn’t apply to juveniles
detained before adjudication as delinquents).
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criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial
release, or diversionary program.”58 It further defines the term “prison”
broadly to mean “any Federal, State, or local facility that incarcerates or
detains juveniles or adults accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or
adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law.”59 The PLRA in the
juvenile justice context applies to juvenile detainees and those adjudicated
delinquent sentenced to confinement in juvenile facilities.60
A. THE PLRA’S EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT
A central feature of the PLRA is its “exhaustion requirement.”61 The
PLRA provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under Section 1983 of this title, or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.”62 “Administrative remedies” are typically defined in intricate
prison grievance policies.63 Whether by design or otherwise, such multilayered grievance policies are difficult to maneuver, and unless adhered to
strictly, they can easily lead to the dismissal of otherwise legitimate and
compelling civil rights claims.64 Essentially, incarcerated youth are
expected to fully comply with the layers and time frames imposed by their
facilities of residence, or face dismissal of their federal constitutional
58 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (emphasis added).
59 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (g)(5) (emphasis added).
60 See Christina A. ex rel. Jennifer A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2003), and
Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373, 1383-85 (4th Cir. 1997) both held that the PLRA limits on
attorneys’ fees applies to cases brought by juveniles adjudicated delinquent; see also, Doe v. Cook Cty.,
1999 WL 1069244, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 1999) (rejecting plaintiffs arguments that the PLRA
doesn’t apply to juveniles detained before adjudication as delinquents).
61 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (g)(3) (West 2008). In addition to the exhaustion requirement, the PLRA
has several other provisions that are of great concern and limit youth from seeking protections from the
court in conditions litigation. The PLRA imposes limitation on prospective relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626
(2000). The PLRA limits relief for emotional and mental injury to only occasions where the plaintiff
can demonstrate physical injury. See 42 U.S.C
§ 1997e(e); see, e.g., Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d
1192, 1199 (11th Cir. 2011). But see Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2002). See also
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2013, PL 113-4, March 7, 2013,
127 Stat 54, amending § 7(e) of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997e(e))
to add “the commission of a sexual act” to the physical harm requirement. The PLRA also restricts the
amount of attorneys’ fees, rather than allow for market rates. See Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373
(4th Cir. 1997). The PLRA requires prisoners who file in forma pauperis to pay the full filing fee,
which is several hundred dollars. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)-(b).
62 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(5). The definition of “prison” includes a facility “that incarcerates or
detains juveniles.”
63 Jones v. Bock, 544 U.S.199, 218 (2007). “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply
with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s
requirements, and not the PLRA, that defines the boundaries of roper exhaustion.”
64 See M.C. (juveniles required to comply with a 5 step grievance policy.).
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claims.
Exhaustion is not a jurisdictional prerequisite65 and therefore not a
pleading requirement. Non-exhaustion, however, is an affirmative
defense66 likely to be raised by defendants who bear the burden of pleading
and proving it. 67 Courts may dismiss claims sua sponte for nonexhaustion, but not without first giving the plaintiff notice and opportunity
to be heard on the issue of exhaustion.68 In the Second Circuit for
example, dismissal with prejudice is the remedy for non-exhaustion if the
administrative remedies are no longer available.69 The exhaustion
requirement however, is applicable only to suits brought by “prisoners.”70
Therefore, once a prisoner has been released from confinement,
“exhaustion” is no longer required.71
Strict adherence to the PLRA exhaustion requirement has been shown to
lead to unjust results and to essentially bar juveniles from bringing suit
even under circumstances where the grievance procedure “ha[d] never been
used” by any juvenile.72 In Brock v. Kenyon County, Ky,73 a juvenile who
had a stun gun used on him and was “grabbed by the testicles” by a guard
was barred from filing a section 1983 claim for abuse.74 In Brock, the
young man asserted that he “[had] never received any information on how
to file a grievance,” and that therefore the grievance procedure was
“unavailable” to him. Further, he asserted that the grievance procedure was
65 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 101 (2006); Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431 (2d Cir. 2003).
66 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007); Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 695 (2d Cir. 2004);
Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1999).
67 Haubert, 179 F.3d at 28-29; Roberts v. Barreras, 484 F.3d 1236, 1240-41 (10th Cir. 2007).
68 Mojias v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 2003) (overruling Neal v. Goord, 267 F.3d 116, 12324 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that notice and hearing are left to the district court’s discretion)); accord
Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670, 675 (2d Cir. 2004).
69 Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2004); but see Armstrong v. Scribner, 350 F. App’x.
186, 187 (9th Cir. 2009) (vacating in part district court’s order dismissing action with prejudice for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies and remanding the case for dismissal without prejudice);
Aggers v. Tyson, 2011 WL 2458083, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 2011), 2011 WL 3319622, at *1 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) (adopting report and recommendation), aff’d, 481 F. App’x 404, 405 (9th Cir. 2012).
70 See, e.g., Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[L]itigants . . . who file prison
condition actions after release from confinement are no longer ‘prisoners’ for purposes of § 1997e(a)
and, therefore, need not satisfy the exhaustion requirements of this provision”); Ahmed v. Dragovich,
297 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that the exhaustion requirement did not apply to a prisoner
who had been released and opining that “[a]ny other view would also be inconsistent with the spirit of
the PLRA, which was designed to deter frivolous litigations by idle prisoners”); Janes v. Hernandez,
215 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 2000); Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998); Harris v. Garner,
216 F.3d 970, 981 (11th Cir. 2000); Arms-Adair v. Black Hawk Cnty., Iowa, No. C13-2008, 2013 WL
2149614, at *2-3 (N.D. Iowa May 16, 2013).
71 Arms-Adair v. Black Hawk Cnty., Iowa, No. C13-2008, 2013 WL 2149614, at *4 (N.D. Iowa
May 16, 2013).
72 Brock v. Kenyon Cnty., Ky, No. 02-5442, 2004 WL 603929 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 2004).
73 Id.
74 Id. See generally Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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not functionally available as “it had never been used by any juvenile
offender.”75 The court rejected his argument, and dismissed his claims of
abuse, stating that it did not have the “discretion to waive exhaustion as it
did prior to the [PLRA].”76
The district court in M.C. ex rel. Crider v. Whitcomb,77 also took a strict
compliance approach to the exhaustion requirement. In M.C., the plaintiff,
a teen who had been adjudicated delinquent, claimed that the state failed to
protect him from assault by other residents and “caused him to be placed in
unsafe housing despite knowing that he needed more protection” in two
separate facilities. Despite the seriousness of the allegations, his young age
and his purported demonstrated need for greater protection, the federal
court dismissed M.C.’s claims because he had not complied with the 5-step
grievance process at each facility (emphasis added). Following at least one
incident, M.C. was placed in segregation without writing materials.
However, the court expected him to ask for the necessary grievance
materials. And, despite the fact that M.C. maintained that “he was unaware
of the exhaustion requirement or the exhaustion procedure,”78 the court
refuted his assertion, relying on a document that M.C. had signed which
purported that he knew about the facilities’ grievance processes79 (emphasis
added). The court then went a step further and stated that even if M.C. was
unaware of the exhaustion requirement or the grievance processes, his
failure to exhaust would still not have been excused.80 Simply put, the
M.C. court decided that once it was established that the “institution ha[d]
an internal administrative grievance procedure” and that the
“administrative process [was] in place”, then all inmates, juveniles
75 Id. at 797 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 799.
77 2007 WL 854019 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 2, 2007). M.C. ex rel. Crider v. Whitcomb 207 WL854019
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 2, 2007) (citing Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir.2006). The Supreme
Court has held that “exhaustion in § 1997e(a) cases is now mandatory.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,
524 (2002). The exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some
other wrong.” Id. at 532. As the Court stated: “[W]e stress the point ... that we will not read futility or
other exceptions into [PLRA’s] statutory exhaustion requirements.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,
741 n. 6 (2001). The filing of administrative remedies is mandatory because the PLRA “eliminated the
[district courts’] discretion to dispense with [it].” Id., at 739. Nonetheless, “[p]rison officials may not
take unfair advantage of the exhaustion requirement, [ ] and a remedy becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison
employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to
prevent a prisoner from exhausting.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809).
77 2007 WL854019 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 2, 2007).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. (citing Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001). “Section 1997e(a) says
nothing about a prisoner’s subjective knowledge of the existence or workings of a grievance process.”
Id.
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included, are required to exhaust, any lack of knowledge about the
requirement or the process notwithstanding.81 There was no discussion
about the actual grievance processes at issue82 or whether such a multitiered grievance process was a reasonable requirement for juveniles
generally or M.C., in particular. Moreover the court did not address
whether M.C. evinced an understanding of the process or had the capacity
to negotiate it.
Unlike M.C. where no grievances were made, in Minix v. Pazera83 the
youth’s mother made multiple complaints to several government officials
about the abuse her son endured while in custody. Yet her efforts to protect
her son fell short of the formal exhaustion requirement, thus resulting in the
dismissal of his federal court claims.84 In Minix, the youth complained to
his mother about horrific abuses. He told her that staff would sometimes
“handcuff [him] so other juvenile detainees could beat him.”85 She
observed bruises on him. He also told her, among other things, that he had
been repeatedly beaten and was once raped by other residents. In what the
court deemed “heroic efforts,” she complained to facility staff, the
superintendent of various facilities, the Deputy Department of Corrections
Commissioner, and finally the Governor, all in an effort to protect her son.
Inexplicably, her efforts were found to be insufficient to satisfy the PLRA.
In its dismissal, the district court judge stated that he did not “wish to
demean Mrs. Minix’s efforts on her son’s behalf: she did what she could do
. . . [but s]he hadn’t exhausted her son’s available administrative
remedies.”86

81 Id. (quoting Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 733-34 (7th Cir. 1999).
82 Id.
83 Minix v. Pazera, 2005 WL 1799538, (N.D. Ind., July 27, 2005).
84 Id., But see in contrast to Minix, in Lewis v. Gagne, 281 F.Supp.2d 429, 434-35 (N.D.N.Y.
2003) the district court denied the State’s claim of non-exhaustion where the plaintiff’s mother had
complained to institutional officials, contacted an attorney, the family court, and the state Child Abuse
and Maltreatment Register to report abuses against her son. The court in Gagne found “reasonable that
plaintiffs believed that at least one effort [the mother] took accomplished the same result that filing
through the formal process would have produced.” Id. The resident manual at issue in Lewis v. Gagne
was the same resident manual in G.B. et al. v. Carrión et al. and Lewis v. Mollette, infra., which
allowed residents multiple options with regard to complaining about treatment, none of which is
mandatory. Cf. Hunter v. Corr. Corp. of Am, 441 F. Supp. 2d 78, 80 (D.D.C. 2006) (dismissing 16-year
old’s claims that he was sexually assaulted by an adult inmate because although he had reported the
abuse to his case manager, the court determined that he had not exhausted his available administrative
remedies).
85 Minnix, 2005 WL 1799538, at *2.
86 Woodford, 548 U.S. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting), Stevens mentions the Minix decision as
an example of the extreme injustice that rigid procedural exhaustion requirements can bring about, and
notes that interpreting the exhaustion requirement to require such rigidity might expose the PLRA to
constitutional challenges.
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B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT
Other courts however have taken a more nuanced approach to the
exhaustion requirement and found exceptions to avoid unjust results like
the ones in Brock, M.C., and Minix.87
In J.P. v. Taft, a class action challenging the lack of access to counsel for
juvenile inmates, the court noted that:
T.M.’s status as a juvenile inmate [was] an integral
element to its exhaustion analysis. . . juvenile
inmates
differ from adult prisoners in that their young age, their
lack of experience with the criminal system, and their
relatively short period of confinement entitle
them
to
greater protection from the state. . . . 88
In addition to T.M.’s status as a juvenile inmate, “this Court finds that
under the circumstances, T.M.’s request that his assault claim be resolved
‘in court’ meets the PLRA’s administrative exhaustion requirements.”89
Further, in Molina v. New York, the district court gave due consideration
to the plaintiff’s juvenile and pro se status at the time of the incident,
denying the state’s motion for summary judgment based on nonexhaustion.90
C. SECOND CIRCUIT: THE HEMPHILL EXCEPTIONS
The Second Circuit has established other exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement.91 For example, if the plaintiff can show that: (1)
administrative remedies were “unavailable”; (2) defendant waived,
forfeited or should be estopped from raising the defense of failure to
exhaust; or (3) “special circumstances” exist, thus excusing exhaustion.92

87 Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 2004).
88 J.P. v. Taft, 439 F.Supp.2d 793, 826 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (quoting John L. v. Adams, 969 F.
2d 228, 234 (6th Cir. 1992); see, e.g, Lewis v. Mollette, 752 F. Supp. 2d 233 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
89 J.P. 349 F.Supp.2d at 826. J.P. case was decided just under a month after Woodford, and does
not address the Woodford decision and how that decision would affect its analysis of the exhaustion
requirements, if at all.
90 Molina v. New York, 697 F. Supp. 2d 276, 282 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
91 The Second Circuit has not addressed whether the Woodford v. Ngo “proper exhaustion” rule
invalidates any part of the Hemphill multi-pronged analysis, but it appears it does not. Justice Breyer’s
concurrence in Woodford, which is cited the Second Circuit decision Giano v. Goord with approval as
an example of the fact that the exhaustion requirement, is not absolute. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 104
(Breyer, J., concurring). In addition, district courts in the Second Circuit have continued to apply the
Hemphill test after the Woodford decision.
92 Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 688.
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1. AVAILABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
In deciding whether an administrative remedy is “available,” 93 courts
must examine the facility’s grievance policy, both plaintiff’s and
defendant’s respective actions and inaction, and the circumstances
surrounding the incidents which gave rise to plaintiff’s complaints. For
example, threats by staff can render all or some remedies “functionally
unavailable” to a prisoner.94 The standard for assessing claims of nonexhaustion because of threats is whether “a similarly situated individual of
ordinary firmness’ [would] have deemed [remedies] available,” in the face
of such threats.95 Since the PLRA does not say when a process is
“available,” the court will apply the ordinary meaning of the term.96 Thus
when the “prisoner causes the unavailability of the grievance process by
simply not filing a grievance in a timely manner, the process is not
unavailable, but rather forfeited.97 However, if the facility does not provide
the young person with the necessary grievance forms98 or if an
administrative remedy is “unknown and unknowable” it is “unavailable.”99
Additionally, some courts outside the Second Circuit have excused
exhaustion by finding that administrative remedies were not available to
adult inmates who lacked the capacity to utilize them by reason of mental
illness or developmental disability, impaired literacy or lack of
education.100 All courts should do the same for juveniles.
In G.B. et al. v. Carrión et al,101 a putative class action seeking: (1)
prospective relief to prevent unlawful physical restraints and to improve
mental health treatment on behalf of the class; and (2) damages for the
93 Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 686.
(Emphasis added).
94 Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 688.
95 Id.
96 M.C. ex rel. Crider v. Whitcomb, 2007 WL 854019 (S.D. Indiana Mar. 2, 2007) (citing Asgrow
Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187, 115 S.Ct 788, 130 L.Ed.2d 682 (1995).
97 Id.
98 See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 29 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Troy D. v. Mickens, 806 F.
Supp.2d 758, 767 (D.N.J. 2011).
99 Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2007); Jackson v. Ivens, 2007
WL2261552, *4 (3d Cir. 2007); Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 580 (7th Cir 2005) (holding that
defendants did not show remedies were available where there was no “clear route” for challenging
certain decisions). Cf. Brock v. Kenyon County, Ky, 2004 WL 603929 (6th Cir. 2004).
100 See, e.g., Cole v. Sabina, 2007 WL 4460617, * 7 (W.D. Pa., Dec 19, 2007) (refusing to dismiss
for non-exhaustion where plaintiff alleged mental disabilities which could account for his noncompliance with grievance procedures); see also Langford v. Ifediora, 2007 WL 1427423, *3-4 (E.D.
Ark, May 11, 2007) (holding plaintiff’s advanced age, deteriorating health, and lack of general
education, combined with failure to provide him assistance in preparing grievances, raised factual issues
concerning the availability of the remedy to him).
101 G.B. et al. v. Carrión et al,. 09 Civ 10582 (S.D.N.Y.) (J. Crotty).
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individual named plaintiffs, the court held that the named plaintiffs were
excused from the exhaustion requirements under all of the Hemphill v.
New York102 exceptions.103 In G.B., the court deemed the grievance policy
unavailable, among other things, largely because the state advised youth in
its Resident Manual that the grievance process was one of many options
that youth could use to make complaints, none of which were
mandatory.104
2. ESTOPPEL
The application of estoppel in this context prevents those defendants
who have engaged in misconduct aimed at preventing plaintiffs from
pursuing administrative claims, such as threatening the use of force or other
harm, from then seeking a dismissal based on non-exhaustion.105 Estoppel
may be applied broadly and not just to the particular defendants who
engaged in the misconduct.106 Prison staff who have engaged in making
threats and/or intimidating inmates or youth from participating in the
relevant grievance procedures will be estopped from asserting the defense
of non-exhaustion.107
3. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
The court may also excuse failure to exhaust on the ground that “special
circumstances” have been “plausibly alleged” that justify the plaintiff’s
“failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements.”108 As
102 380 F.3d. 680 (2d Cir. 2004).
103 Id. (denying the State’s motion to dismiss on summary judgment grounds for non exhaustion,
for the following reasons: (1) the administrative remedies put forth by defendant were unavailable; (2)
defendant was estopped from asserting a non -exhaustion defense; and (3) special circumstances
applied. (Judge Crotty’s Order dated July 27, 2011).
104 Id. See also Lewis v. Mollette, 752 F. Supp. 2d 233, 241 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying the state’s
motion for summary judgment, referring to the same Resident Manual as in G.B. on the ground that the
State’s grievance policy was “unavailable.” In Mollette, the court explicitly gave weight to factors such
as plaintiff’s young age, (fifteen), and the fact that at the time of the incident he was being held in the
facility’s mental health unit.
105 Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d at 686, 688-89; Benjamin v. Comm. of Corr. Dep’t., 375 Fed.
Appx. 114, 115. (2d Cir. April 29, 2010) (summary order).
106 Brown v. Koenigsmann, 2005 WL 1925649, at *2 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 10, 2005) (“Nothing in
Ziemba, however, requires that the action or inaction which is the basis for the estoppel be that of the
particular defendant in the prisoner’s case”) (interpreting Ziemba v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 163-64 (2d
Cir. 2004).
107 Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 690 (noting that the standard is whether a similarly situated individual of
“ordinary firmness” would have been deterred from pursuing regular procedures).
108 Id. at 686. See Braham v. Clancy, 425 F.3d 177, 184 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanding for
consideration whether the prisoner’s receipt of the relief he had requested without filing a formal
grievance constituted a “special circumstance” that might reasonably lead to a conclusion that he had
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previously stated, the applicable rules for exhausting administrative
remedies are found in the prison’s own requirements.109 Where the
grievance procedure is not provided to youth, or where it is provided in an
ambiguous manner, “special circumstances” exist and the exhaustion
requirement can be excused.110 Additional circumstances that may provide
justification for non-exhaustion include, but are not limited to: reliance on a
reasonable interpretation of the grievance rules,111 procedural irregularities,
obstruction in the grievance process,112 psychiatric reasons,113 or where the
nature of the relief sought by plaintiff is beyond the power of the custodial
agency.114
Additional “special circumstances” include traits or disabilities that
make it difficult or nearly impossible for prisoners to effectively carry out a
multi-tiered grievance process. Such traits include young age, emotional,
mental and educational disabilities, developmental delays, mental
retardation, and lack of access to counsel or advocates.115 Should the court
conclude that a juvenile in custody evincing any one or more of the
aforementioned traits has failed to exhaust, it should find that the failure
was justified by “special circumstances.”116
prevailed in the grievance process); Rivera v. Pataki, 2005 WL 407710, at *12 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 7, 2005)
(finding special circumstances where the prisoner “did the best he could to follow DOCS regulations
while responding to an evolving legal framework”; noting the plaintiff had filed at a time when it
appeared that his claim need not be exhausted, and had tried to exhaust after dismissal for nonexhaustion mandated by the subsequent Supreme Court Porter v. Nussle decision).
109 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).
110 See Lewis v. Gagne, 281 F. Supp. 2d 429, 434 (2003); see also Lewis v. Mollette, 752 F. Supp.
2d 233, 241 (year).
111 Giano v. Selsky, 380 F.3d 670, 676 (year) (rejecting procedural default rule, which requires
strict compliance with rules, and finding plaintiff’s interpretation of rules reasonable even if incorrect);
Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 68990 (year) (holding plaintiff’s claim that, under the harassment
grievance procedure, exhausting by writing to the Superintendent at least reflected a reasonable
interpretation of the rules, was not “manifestly meritless” and should be considered on remand).
112 Brownell, 446 F.3d at 312-13 (2d Cir. 2006) (failure of prison staff to follow prison system’s
rules); Tyree v. Zenk, 2007 WL 527918, at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 14, 2007) (confusing and ambiguous
instructions by prison staff) (citing Giano, 380 F.3d at 678); Hairston v. LaMarche, 2006 WL 2309592,
at *9-11 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 10, 2006) (referral by Superintendent to the Inspector General, the failure of
either to provide the plaintiff with a decision, lack of clarity how he could take the process any further);
Roque v. Armstrong, 392 F.Supp.2d 382, 391 (D. Conn. 2005) neither the prisoner nor the grievance
system entirely followed the rules but the prisoner had received a response from the Commissioner, the
final grievance authority);
113 Petty v. Goord, 2007 WL 724648, at *8 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 5, 2007) (prisoner was transferred to a
mental hospital after filing a grievance and missed the final deadline; the court notes lack of evidence of
his mental state at the time, and holds that two months plus in a mental hospital constituted special
circumstances). But see Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 869 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2012)(finding that
prisoner’s alleged inability to read, his mental retardation and the prison staff’s failure to inform him of
his grievance process did not excuse his failure to exhaust).
114 See Handberry v. Thompson, 92 F. Supp.2d 244, 247-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
115 See J.P. v. Taft, 439 F. Supp. 2d 793, 826 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (status as a juvenile “integral
element” in exhaustion analysis).
116 See Giano, supra note 102, at 675; see also Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 312-13 (2d Cir.
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Failure to exhaust was also excused, for example, where the court found
that the Federal Bureau of Prisons had “predetermined the issue before it”
and therefore any attempt by the youth to exhaust would have been
futile.117 The aforementioned exceptions are discretionary and hotly
litigated by experienced counsel. So long as the PLRA includes juveniles
in its definition of prisoner, marginalized youth who suffer harm in jails or
prisons will continue to be prevented from seeking protections and
compensation in federal courts.
IV. ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND EXHAUSTION118
“[I]t would be misguided [from a moral standpoint] to equate the failings
of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a
minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”119 Anyone who lives with
a teen can attest to the fact that they think differently than adults and often
require concerted support and guidance to make sound decisions.120 The
Supreme Court has aptly stated “youth is more than chronological fact . . .
It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to
influence and to psychological damage.”121 In the last thirty years or so,
scientific research on adolescent brain development has emerged to support
the conventional wisdom and to illustrate how adolescent brains differ from
those of adults.122
In recent years, citing findings in adolescent brain development research,
the Supreme Court has held in several decisions – Roper v. Simmons,123
2006).
117 See A.C.H. v. United States, 2006 WL 3487116, at *3 (D. Minn. 2006).
118 This is not a pun.
119 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)
120 “[A]s any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies respondent and
[Simmons’] amici cite tend
to confirm, “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more
often
than in adults and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous
and ill considered actions and decisions.” Roper v. Simmons (citing Johnson v. Texas,509 U.S. 360,
367; see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–116 (“Even the normal 16–year–old
customarily lacks the maturity of an adult”).
121 Roper v. Simmons, Amicus Curiae brief at 21 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
115-16 (1982) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979).
122 Roper, Amicus Curiae brief prepared on behalf of Respondent Simmons by the American
Medical Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry,
American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry; American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law;
National Association of Social Workers, Missouri Chapter of the National Association of Social
Workers, and National Mental Health Associations. See also Anna Rapa, Comment, One Brick Too
Many: The Prison Litigation Reform Act As a Barrier to Legitimate Juvenile Lawsuits, 23 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV 263, 276-77. (2006). See also J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2397 (2011).
123 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment’s declaration against “cruel and
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Miller v. Alabama,124 and Graham v. Florida,125 – that youth are entitled to
greater protections in sentencing considerations. The Court in Miller v.
Alabama articulated (in reference to the mandatory penalty schemes of
imposing life without the possibility of parole on juvenile offenders) a
founding principle from Graham and Roper: “that imposition of a State’s
most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they
were not children.”126 The same should be true for any blanket law that
seeks to include juvenile offenders with adult offenders as the PLRA does.
Brain development research reveals among other things that “[t]he
difference between teenage and adult behavior “lies in what scientists have
characterized as ‘deficiencies in the way adolescents think,’ and their
inability to perceive and weigh risks and benefits accurately.”127 So-called
“normal adolescents cannot be expected to operate with the level of
maturity, judgment, risk aversion or impulse control of an adult.
Adolescents cannot be expected to transcend their own psychological or
biological capacities . . . [and] an adolescent who has suffered brain
trauma, a dysfunctional family life, violence or abuse [as many
incarcerated youth have] cannot be presumed to operate even at standard
levels for adolescents.” 128 Further brain development research reveals that
adolescents “put greater emphasis on short-term consequences and discount
future consequences more than adults. Additionally, stress and emotions
affect cognition in teens, further influencing decision-making.129 It is
difficult to imagine a setting that is more stressful and emotion-inducing
than a prison or jail. Incarcerated youth face multiple stressors day in and
day out, including confrontations, violence, restraints and isolation, to
name a few.
Additionally, youth are vulnerable to social pressure from staff and/or
other youth, both of whom may discourage reporting, whether by explicit
threat of retaliation or by name calling and intimidation. The scientific
research tells us that “[t]he typical adolescent is . . . more vulnerable to
unusual punishment” prohibits the execution of individuals whose capital offense(s) were committed
before the age of 18, specifically that “juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the
worst offenders.”).
124 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory sentencing of
life imprisonment without parole for individuals whose qualifying offenses were committed before the
age of 18) (emphasis added).
125 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the sentencing of life
imprisonment without parole for individuals who commit non-homicide offenses before the age of 18).
126 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2458 (2012).
127 Roper, Amicus Curiae brief at 6.
128 Roper, Amicus Curiae brief at 20.
129 Roper, Amicus Curiae brief at 8.
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peer pressure than an adult.”130 S/he will seek the acceptance of his/her
peers, thus avoid doing things that would undermine their approval, such as
“snitching” on staff or other youth by filing a grievance. Youth may not
report abuses because the grievance processes fail to assure confidentiality.
Many youth report being labeled a “snitch” for filing a grievance.131 And
being labeled a “snitch” has real consequences inside. It can lead to a lack
of privileges such as phone calls or rewards or it can lead to taunting and
physical aggression from other youth and staff.
Adolescent brain development, overwhelming social pressures, and the
stress of being incarcerated conspire to increase the likelihood that
incarcerated youth will fail to satisfy exhaustion requirements.
Furthermore, the scientific literature suggests that incarcerated youth are
ill-equipped to understand the consequences of that failure, which include
forfeiting the ability to bring a future federal claim.
V. SHINING A LIGHT, THE NEED FOR INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT132
Juvenile justice agencies that house children frequently lack
independent, external oversight. These agencies largely police themselves
through internal mechanisms, with some oversight by other governmental
agencies.133 American Bar Association Resolution 104b calls for all
jurisdictions to “establish independent monitoring entities for all prisons,
jails and juvenile detention facilities.”134 In addition to external oversight,
post-sentencing advocacy by juvenile defenders is critical to among other
things ensure (1) compliance with court orders; (2) access to appropriate
educational and/or other services; and (3) humane treatment and
appropriate conditions of confinement for youth.135
130 Roper, Amicus Curiae brief at 8.
131 Roper, Amicus Curiae brief at 7. [D]efficiencies in the adolescent mind and emotional and
social development are especially pronounced when other facts—such as stress, emotions and peer
pressure—enter the equation.” These factors work on the adolescent’s mind with “special force.” Id.
132 Michele Dietch, Distinguishing the Various Functions of Effective Prison Oversight, 30 PACE
L. REV. 1438 (2010). Oversight is a means of achieving the twin objectives of transparency of public
institutions and accountability for the operation of safe and human prisons and jails. Id. at 1439.
133 It is important that prisons and jails have their own internal mechanisms—”for identifying
problems, informing management about those concerns, and addressing wrongdoings” however these
internal mechanisms do not allow for public accountability, and by design remain confidential. Id. See
also Civil Rights of Institutional Persons Act (CRIPA); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994. See also 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 168 et seq.
134 Monitoring Conditions from the Inside and Out: Developing Comprehensive Quality
Assurance and External Oversight Systems, May 22, 2013, at 10, available at www.nc4yc.org (citing
ABA Resolution 104b (2008)).
135 The American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Standards and the National Juvenile Defense
Standards call for representation following dismissal or the entry of a final disposition in a variety of
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The Department of Justice (DOJ) Special Litigation Unit is one entity
that has oversight of juvenile facilities. It investigates and monitors
conditions of confinement in many juvenile detention and correctional
facilities under the Civil Rights of Institutional Persons Act (CRIPA).136
However, the DOJ is limited in its capacity and scope137 to investigate and
remedy unsafe conditions. There are thousands of juvenile facilities nationwide, and countless adult facilities housing juveniles, yet in a ten year span
the DOJ had enforced less than a hundred legally required conditions of
confinement cases in juvenile justice facilities.138 Thus, thousands of
young people are inevitably left without the protections afforded by the
CRIPA statute.
A host of other local, state and federal agencies possess varying degrees
of oversight responsibilities for incarcerated youth. The Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention,139 American Correctional
Association,140 State Commission on Corrections,141 Performance-based
Standards,142 the Justice Center for the Protection of People with Special

matters. Juvenile Justice Standards Annotated A Balanced Approach, American Bar Association’s
Center for Criminal Justice Part X Representation After Disposition 1996; National Juvenile Defense
Standards Part VII Role of Juvenile Defense Counsel After Disposition 2012.
136 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (“CRIPA”), and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (“Section 14141”). See also footnote 11 supra.
137 See Ana Rapa, One Brick Too Many: The Prison Litigation Reform Act As a Barrier to
Legitimate Juvenile Lawsuits, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 263, 276-77. (2006). The DOJ is only
statutorily authorized to investigate claims involving patterns and practices and not individual claims.
Id. at 300 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997a).
138 NATIONAL CENTER FOR YOUTH IN CUSTODY CREATING AND SUSTAINING IMPROVED
CONDITIONS FOR YOUTH IN CUSTODY, September 12, 2012. See also The U.S. Census Bureau notes
that “CJRP [Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement] collects data from over 3100 public and
private juvenile facilities that hold juvenile delinquents and/or status offenders. Data Resources
Program 2013: Funding for Analysis of Existing Data, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OMB No. 1121-0329, p.
6 (2013) available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/sl001029.pdf.
139 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. Congress enacted the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act (Pub. L. No. 93-415, 42 U.S.C. § 5601 et seq.) in 1974. The
legislation established the OJJDP to support local and state efforts to prevent delinquency and improve
the juvenile justice system. On November 2, 2002, Congress reauthorized the JJDP Act.
http://ojjdp.gov/about/legislation.html.
140 American Correctional Association Standards for Juvenile Facilities.” Adult and juvenile
correctional agencies should provide community and institutional programs and services that offer a full
range of effective, just, humane and safe dispositions and sanctions for accused and adjudicated
offenders. To assure accountability and professional responsibility, these programs and services should
meet accepted professional and performance-based standards and obtain accreditation.”
http://www.aca.org/government/policyresolution/view.asp?ID=44.
141 Among other things, the New York State Commission on Corrections evaluates, investigates,
and oversees correctional facilities. In 1996, the role of the New York State Commission of Correction
was expanded to include oversight of the management and operations of the secure facilities operated
by the Office of Children and Family Services. http://www.scoc.ny.gov/
142 The Council of Juvenile Correctional Administrators in a national non-profit entity created to
improve programs and practices within juvenile justice systems. http://pbstandards.org/about-us.
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Needs,143 Protection and Advocacy Systems, Ombudsman programs,144
Quality Assurance and Improvement programs145 and legislative bodies,
are just a few in New York State alone. While plentiful in number, these
entities lack independence, coordination and authority, and consequently
do not offer necessary external oversight. Effective external oversight
would consist of the following features: (1) Regulation; (2) Audit; (3)
Accreditation; (4) Investigation; (5) Legal (the use of courts and the legal
process); (6) Reporting; and (7) Inspection and Monitoring.146 Oversight
agencies can work cooperatively to accomplish all of these aims, as “it
would be a mistake to seek to combine all these functions within one
entity”, as “[n]o one entity can meaningfully serve every function.”147
Harmful conditions exist in juvenile facilities across the country,148
leaving countless youth vulnerable to harm and/or without necessary
treatment. Independent, external oversight with a monitoring149 component
143 The New York State Protection of People with Special Needs Act went into effect on June 30,
2013. The law created a new state agency called the Justice Center for the Protection of People with
Special Needs, to implement the standards and practices in the nation to protect the special needs
community from abuse and neglect. It seeks to standardize oversight, reporting, and investigations
involving adults and children in residential care, including will residential care facilities sentenced as
juvenile delinquents and juvenile offenders.
144 Ombudsman is a Swedish word for “representative.” An Ombudsman acts to “resolve citizen
complaints against public officials.” See Beyond the Wall at 9.
145 Monitoring Conditions from the Inside and Out: Developing Comprehensive Quality
Assurance and External Oversight Systems, May 22, 2013. www.nc4yc.org.
146 Monitoring Conditions from the Inside and Out: Developing Comprehensive Quality
Assurance and External Oversight Systems, May 22, 2013, at 8. www.nc4yc.org; see also Michele
Dietch, Distinguishing the Various Functions of Effective Prison Oversight, 30 PACE L. REV. 1438
(2010).
147 Id. at 1440.
148 New York State prior to the recent reform efforts is but one example. In 2008, the DOJ
embarked on an extensive investigation into four OCFS facilities to examine, among other things, the
agency’s use of force and restraints practices and its mental health treatment. The DOJ investigation
began not long after the 2006 tragic death of a 15 year old boy who died following a physical restraint
by staff at the OCFS Tryon Residential Center, located in upstate New York more than three hours from
the teen’s Bronx County home. In its findings letter following its investigation, the DOJ concluded,
among other things, that OCFS “[s]taff at the four facilities [under investigation] consistently used a
high degree of force to gain control in nearly every type of situation,” and that “restraints are used
frequently and result in a high number of injuries.” See also DOJ findings letter dated August 14, 2009).
The DOJ also concluded that mental health care at the facilities “substantially depart[ed] from generally
accepted professional standards.” Id. As a result, in 2010, DOJ filed and immediately settled a lawsuit
against New York State to address these constitutional violations. See United States v. New York, 10CV-00858 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). Soon thereafter, the New York State Governor’s Task Force on
Transforming Juvenile Justice created to assess the treatment of youth in OCFS custody determined that
the problems identified in the DOJ findings letter existed throughout the statewide system. See
http://www.modelsforchange.net/newsroom/106. To date, OCFS continues to work with DOJ and its
monitors to address the constitutional violations and to improve the conditions for young people in
some of its facilities.
149 Monitoring involves an entity outside of the corrections/detention agency with the power and
the mandate to routinely inspect institutions and to report on how people within that facility are treated.
Id. at 9.
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is critical for ensuring a credible assessment of what is happening inside
facilities. Robust external oversight would allow administrators and the
public-at-large to properly evaluate facility programs and the needs of both
staff and incarcerated youth. Furthermore, such oversight is a prerequisite
for the creation and implementation of policies and practices that are both
effective at reducing recidivism and ensuring humane treatment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The following cases are illustrative of the harms incarcerated youth face
and the call for greater protections. They exemplify the lack of
accountability and independent oversight in juvenile facilities. A few days
after arriving at the facility, 14-year-old J.M.150 became involved in an
argument with another youth. The two teens were separated and told to go
to their rooms. J.M. went to his room. Shortly thereafter, a staff member
came to J.M.’s door, threatened him and without further warning, grabbed
him, picked him up and dropped him to the floor face first. As he was
holding J.M. down, the staff member forcibly twisted J.M.’s arm behind his
back until it broke, while another staff member held his legs. J.M
complained that he couldn’t breathe throughout the restraint.
15-year-old L.E.151 refused to get out of bed one morning. A staff
member pulled him out of bed by his arm and forced him to his feet. A
supervisor joined the staff member and the two men yelled at L.E. When
L.E. attempted to turn away from the two men, one of the men grabbed
L.E.’s hand, swung him around and slammed him to the ground face first,
cracking his front teeth, causing his mouth to bleed, and causing him
significant pain to his arm, face and body.
Neither J.M nor L.E filed a grievance. Despite the severity of the injuries
inflicted, the staff involved were never punished for their excessive force
and violations of restraint policies.
As previously stated, incarcerated youth are vulnerable due to a variety
of interrelated factors. They are marginalized from their own families,
communities, counsel and the courts in facilities that lack independent
oversight. Adolescents, as a result of their brain development, are
particularly susceptible to peer pressure and their own immature decision
making, while lacking the capacity to recognize the need to report and the
long term benefit of reporting grievances. In addition, many adolescents
150
151

2012 Interview with J.M.
2012 Interview with L.E.
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suffer from cognitive, psychological and developmental impairments, thus
impeding their ability to file grievances. Despite calls for post sentencing
advocacy for youth, incarcerated youth have limited access to counsel and
legal information, they often fear retaliation for reporting abuse, and lastly,
they face the daunting obstacles created by the PLRA.
As noted, it is the responsibility of the adults to protect incarcerated
youth from harm, but they are failing to do so. Congress can no longer turn
a blind eye to the harms that incarcerated youth face, and must amend the
PLRA to exempt all youth, whether prosecuted and sentenced as juveniles
or adults from its requirements. It is not enough that certain courts have
established exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, the legislature must
follow suit and amend the PLRA to create an exception for youth. Without
greater post sentencing access to counsel and the courts, and more robust
independent oversight, incidents like the ones described by J.M. and L.E.
will continue to occur and will go unreported, thus allowing abusive staff
and deliberately indifferent administrators to act with impunity.

